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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson"
I. INTRODUCTION
In its 1999 Session, the General Assembly enacted legislation
dealing with wills, trusts, and estates that added, amended, or
repealed a number of sections of the Code of Virginia in its 1999
Session. In addition, there were eleven Supreme Court of Virginia
opinions and one Bankruptcy Court opinion in the period covered by
this review that involved issues of interest to the general practitio-
ner as well as the specialist in wills, trusts, and estates. This article
reports on all of these legislative and judicial developments.'
II. LEGISLATION
A. Fiduciary Investments-Uniform Prudent Investor Act
Acting upon the recommendations of a joint study of fiduciary
investing that was prepared by the Virginia Bar Association and the
Virginia Bankers Association, the 1992 Session repealed Virginia's
traditional prudent man rule and replaced it with a portfolio-
oriented prudent investor rule.2 The 1999 Session replaced this 1992
version of the prudent investor rule with the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act,3 which will apply to all fiduciaries' actions and
decisions occurring after December 31, 1999, even if their control-
* Professor of Law, emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Virginia Code sections, they will
often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated, those
section numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections and to the 1999
supplement for the new sections.
2. See Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 810,1992 Va. Acts 1278 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.1-328,5.1-88.2, 6.1-21, 6.1-195.86, 26-40,26-40.01, 26-44,26-45.1, 51.1-803, 54.1-
1119, 54.1-2113 (Repl. Vol. 1995)). The background and scope of this legislation is discussed
in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey ofVirginiaLaw: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 26 U. RICH.
L. REV. 873, 890-91 (1992).
3. UNwF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, 7B U.L. 57 (1985) (Supp. 1999). Copies of the Act,
containing the Commissioners' official comments, which will be very important to an
understanding the Act's operation, may be obtained from the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 211 East Ontario Street, Suite 1300, Chicago, Illinois
60611.
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ling document became effective prior to that date.4 Although the
basic concept of Virginia's prudent-investor rule is not changed by
the Uniform Act, the latter does (i) contain a clearer and more
comprehensive expression of the rule, (ii) align Virginia with the
majority of other states, and (iii) deal with a number of other
parallel concerns where statutory guidance will be helpful, such as
diversification, loyalty, impartiality, delegation of investment and
management functions, duties at inception of trust, etc.5 Although
a detailed comparison of the Uniform Act to prior Virginia law is not
feasible within the confines of this annual review, a listing of the
significant Virginia modifications to the Uniform Act will be found
in the footnotes.6
B. Fiduciary Accounting-Uniform Principal and Income Act
The regular course of a trustee's or personal representative's
stewardship contemplates a number and variety of receipts and
expenditures. The correct allocation of these items between present
4. See Act of Mar. 28, 1999, ch. 772, 1999 Va. Acts 1356 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 2645.3 to -45.14 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
5. See id.
6. The following are the Virginia amendments to the Uniform Act, all of which were
proposed by the Virginia Bar Association's Section on Wills, Trusts, and Estates. All section
references are to the Act as enacted in Virginia, and not as originally promulgated.
(1) § 26-45.3(A). After the reference to "subsection B," the language "§§ 26-40 and
26-40.01" was inserted. This is a clearer expression of a somewhat similar reference found in
former § 26-45.1(A). It recognizes the continuing (i) limited applicability of the "original legal
list" and (ii) unlimited applicability of the "mini legal list." The latter's three "safe harbor"
provisions will be of great importance to the lay fiduciary charged with investing a relatively
small amount.
(2) § 26-45.3(B). The second and third sentences were added to continue the provisions
of former § 26-45.1(E), dealing with waiver of the prudent investor rule. In the light of this
change, this subsection's second sentence in the Uniform Act ("A trustee is not liable to a
beneficiary to the extent that the trustee acted in reasonable reliance on the provisions of the
trust.") was deleted as no longer necessary.
(3) § 26-45.4(G). This entire subsection was added to continue the provisions of former
§ 26-45.1(F), added to the Code in 1998, to deal with certain insurance concerns that are
discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates,
32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1405, 1412 (1998).
(4) § 26-45.11. After the word "modified," the words "by language articulating the
investment standard to which the trustee is to be held" were inserted in order to provide for
greater certainty of result in cases of claimed modification than the provisions of the Uniform
Act were believed to give in their original formulation.
(5) § 26-45.13. This entire section is new. The Uniform Act was drafted to be applicable
only to "trustees" and "trusts." The amendment, taken mostly from former section 26-45. 1(G),
makes the Act applicable to all statutory fiduciaries referred to in section 8.01-2, as well as
to an agent under a written power of attorney.
(6) § 64.1-57(1)(c) and (cl). These statutory boilerplate powers dealing with fiduciary
investments were deleted as being no longer necessary or desirable in light of the Act's
adoption.
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and future beneficiaries is determined by a jurisdiction's principal
and income law. The 1999 Session replaced Virginia's version of the
Uniform Principal and Income Act (1931)' with the Uniform
Principal and Income Act (1997)8 for all trusts, decedents' estates,
and nontrust estates existing on January 1, 2000, except as the
Virginia Code or a controlling document expressly provides to the
contrary.9 It would be difficult to overstate the importance of this
enactment because of (i) the prior conflict between investing under
a prudent investor rule and allocating the receipts therefrom under
prior law,10 (ii) the number and variety of new financial instruments
not dealt with by prior law, and (iii) the increasing use of the inter
vivos trust as a will substitute that was not contemplated by prior
law. Although a detailed comparison of the Uniform Act to prior
Virginia law is not feasible within the confines of this annual
review, a listing of the significant Virginia modifications to the
Uniform Act will be found in the footnotes.'1
7. Act of Mar. 30, 1936, ch. 432, 1936 Va. Acts 1024 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 55-253 to -268 (Repl. Vol. 1995)).
8. UNIF. PRINCIPALAND INCOMiEACT, 7B U.LA 3 (1997) (Supp. 1999). Copies of the Act,
containing the Commissioners' official comments, which will be indispensable to an
understanding of the Act's operation, may be obtained from the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 211 East Ontario Street, Suite 1300, Chicago, Illinois
60611.
9. See Act of Apr. 7, 1999, ch. 975,1999 Va. Acts 2568 (codified as amended atVA. CODE
ANN. §§ 55-277.1 to -27.33 (Cure. Supp. 1999)).
10. This conflictis discussed inJ. RodneyJohnson,Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills,
Trusts, and Estates, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 873, 890-91 (1992). The resolution of this conflict is
found in the default rule of new section 55-277.4 that authorizes a fiduciary to make
adjustments between the principal and income accounts in order to reach a result that is fair
and reasonable to all beneficiaries. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-277.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
11. The following are the Virginia amendments to the Uniform Act, all of which were
proposed by the Virginia Bar Association's Section on Wills, Trusts, and Estates. All section
references are to the Act as enacted in Virginia, and not as originally promulgated.
(1) § 55-277.3(C). This entire subsection is new. The Uniform Act provides a body of
default rules that can be avoided in several ways, one of which is by giving a fiduciary a
"discretionary power of administration." The purpose of the added subsection is to guard
against an almost universally used boilerplate power-permitting a fiduciary to "allocate
receipts and expenses between income and principal"-from being interpreted as such a
"discretionary power of administration." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-277.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
(2) § 55-277.4. All references to "trustee" in this section were changed to "fiduciary," in
order to make the Act's fiduciary's adjustment power applicable to the personal
representative of a decedent's estate.
(3) § 55-277.4(D). The second sentence of this subsection was added to incorporate an
existing procedural remedy.
(4) § 55-277.4(G). This entire subsection is new. It was added in order to implement the
decision mentioned in paragraph (2) of this footnote, that is, to make this section applicable
to a decedent's estate.
(5) § 55-277.6. All references to "trustee" in this section were changed to "fiduciary" in
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C. Estate Planning-Testamentary Pour-Over to Inter Vivos Trust
Reform
Whereas traditional estate planning has been will-based, a
number of today's estate planners sometimes favor a plan based
upon an inter vivos trust. In these inter vivos trust-based plans, the
desire to integrate all of the client's assets into one management
vehicle following the client's death is accomplished by making a
testamentary gift, called a "pour-over," of the client's residuary
probate estate to the inter vivos trust. The 1999 Session replaced
Virginia's aging pour-over statute with the more modern Uniform
Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act (1991)12 for wills of testators
who die after June 30, 1999. " Although the form of the Uniform Act
differs from its predecessor, the substance of its pour-over provisions
differs in only three respects-all of which are thought to be intent-
effectuating. 4
order to make the Act's rules dealing with distributions to residuary and remainder
beneficiaries applicable to the personal representative of a decedent's estate.
(6) § 55-277.31. This entire section, dealing with expenses and receipts in nontrust
estates, was added. Former section 55-265 dealt with the allocation of expenses in nontrust
estates, but there was no prior provision relating to the apportionment of receipts in nontrust
estates.
(7) § 55-277.33. This section, dealing with the Act's applicability, was amended to include
references to "nontrust estates" in light of the amendment made in paragraph (6) of this
footnote.
(8) § 64.1-57(1)(il). A statutory boilerplate fiduciary power dealing with allocation of
receipts and expenditures, was deleted because it i) is no longer necessary or desirable, and
(ii) might create an initial confusion with the "discretionary power of administration"
discussed in paragraph (1) supra of this footnote.
12. UNIF. TESTAMENTARYADDITIONSTO TRUSTS ACT, 8B U.L-.A 66 (Supp. 1999) (codified
as amended at VA_ CODE ANN. § 64.1-73.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999)). A discussion of this Act, in the
context of Virginia law, will be found in J. Rodney Johnson, Reforming Virginia's Pour-Over
Rules-Three Proposals, 15 VA. ST. B. TI. &EST.NEWSL. 2 (1998). Copies of the Act, containing
the Commissioners' official comments which will be helpful in understanding the Act's
operation, may be obtained from the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, 211 East Ontario Street, Suite 1300, Chicago, Illinois 60611.
13. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). The original statute will continue
to govern pour-overs "under the will of a decedent dying ... before July 1, 1999." Id. §
64.1-73(H) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
14. These changes are: (1) instead of the receptacle trust having to be executed "before
or concurrently with" the pour-over will, it may be executed "before, concurrently with, or
after," id. § 64.1-73.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999); (2) instead of a mandatory failure of the pour-over
if the receptacle trust is inoperative at testator's death, it will fail "unless the testator's will
provides otherwise," id. § 64.1-73.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999); and (3) instead of allowing post-
death amendments of the receptacle trust to govern the pour-over portion only"if the testator
expressly so specifies in his will," they will govern "unless the testator's will provides
otherwise," id. § 64.1-73.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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In addition, the 1999 legislation deals with two related matters
that are significant changes in Virginia law and policy. First,
although the final barriers against a nonresident individual serving
as a sole court-appointed fiduciary of a Virginian's estate fell in
1996,15 there has been no corresponding relaxation of the prohibition
against a nonresident fiduciary corporation serving in such a
capacity. 6 This complete corporate prohibition comes to an end with
the enactment of the 1999 pour-over legislation that expressly
permits a nonresident "entity" to serve as trustee of a receptacle
trust receiving a pour-over under a Virginia will.' Second, as a part
of the earlier changes in the law allowing a nonresident individual
to serve, noted above, it was also stipulated that such a fiduciary
must always provide surety upon the official bond, even if the
language of the governing document expressly waived the surety
requirement."8 This mandatory surety requirement is now elimi-
nated for any nonresident, individual or entity, serving as trustee of
an inter vivos trust receiving a pour-over under a Virginia will. 9
D. Guardian of Minor-Reform
During the study of Virginia's adult guardianship laws that
culminated in legislative reform in 1997,20 a number of parallel
problems were discovered in the guardianship laws applicable to the
property of minors. These latter problems have been addressed in a
comprehensive reform package drafted by the Wills, Trusts, and
Estates section of the Virginia Bar Association, and enacted by the
1999 Session. The new legislation "makes a guardianship more like
a typical minor's trust insofar as the guardian's administrative and
distributive powers" are concerned.2 Although the nature and space
15. The same was also true in regard to the privately appointed trustee of an inter vivos
trust who was intended to receive a pour-over addition under the settlor's will. For the history
of this evolution, see J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and
Estates, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1249 (1997), and sources therein cited.
16. See VA. CODE ANN. § 26-59(B) (Repl. Vol. 1997); id. § 64.1-73(A)(2)(ii) (Cum. Supp.
1999).
17. See id. § 64.1-73.1(W) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
18. See id. § 64.1-73(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
19. See id. For a discussion ofthe two changes mentioned in this paragraph, see Johnson,
supra note 12.
20. For an excellent discussion of this 1997 legislation by a person who was involved in
every step of its development, see John E. Donaldson, Reform of Adult Guardianship Law,
32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1273 (1998).
21. H.B. 1633, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Feb. 27, 1999, ch.
16,1999 Va. Acts 22) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-17.4,31-1 to -9, 31-14,31-
18.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999)). The actis "applicable to all guardianships, whenever created, except
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limitations of this survey article preclude any meaningfiul analysis
of this far-reaching legislation, a summary of its major elements
would include the following: (1) clarifying the standard governing
expenditures for a minor's benefit, requiring a minor's other
resources to be taken into account in making disbursements, and
eliminating the prohibition against use of principal for a minor's
benefit without prior court approval;22 (2) endowing the guardian
with extensive administrative powers over the minor's estate,
including the power to sell real estate unless, in the latter case, the
court or commissioner of accounts affirmatively imposes require-
ments on such a sale;23 and (3) codifying Virginia's common-law
prohibition against using a minor's property for the minor's support
where the minor has a parent capable of providing such support.'
In regard to a parent's support obligation, the legislation as
introduced would not permit the assets of a minor who has a living
parent to be expended for the minor's benefit without (i) permission
in the document under which the minor's estate is derived, or (ii) a
court order entered in a proceeding in which the minor is repre-
sented by a guardian ad litem wherein the judge makes one of three
alternative factual findings.2 ' However, as a result of the lobbying
efforts of the Virginia Conference of Commissioners of Accounts,26
that a guardian who qualifies prior to July 1,1999, shall have the power to make conveyances
of his ward's estate only in accordance with the laws in effect on June 30, 1999 [unless such
a guardian requalifies thereafter]." VA. CODE ANN. § 31-18.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
22. "[A]fter first taking into account the minor's other sources of income, support rights,
and other reasonably available resources of which the guardian is aware, [the guardian] shall
provide for the minor's health, education, maintenance and support from the income of such
estate and, if income is not sufficient, from the corpus thereof." Id. § 31-8 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
23. These powers are found in VA. CODE ANN. section 31-14.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). The
real- estate restriction is found in section 31-14.1(B).
24. See VA. CODEANN. § 31-8.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999); see also 9AMICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE
Parent and Child § 20 (discussing the common law background); Supreme Court of Virginia
Form CC-1683 (INST) (1998) (InstructionsforAccountforMinor) ("[A] Guardian may use the
income earned on the minor's estate for the maintenance and education of the minor, only to
the extent the parent(s) cannot provide for those expenses.") The necessity of such a rule is
obvious because, in its absence, the child's funds could be used to satisfy the parent's legal
obligation of support, and thus the parent-not the child-would become the de facto
beneficiary of the child's assets. For this reason, the parent so benefitting from a child's assets
would have to include the amount in question in the parent's gross income for income tax
purposes. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1988).
25. The court must find "that (a) the parent is unable to completely fulfill the parental
duty ofsupporting the child, (b) the parent cannot for some reason be required to provide such
support, or (c) a proposed distribution is beyond the scope of parental duty of support in the
circumstances of a specific case." VA. CODE ANN. § 31-8.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
26. This is a trade organization of commissioners of accounts. It should not be confused
with the Standing Committee on Commissioners of Accounts created by the Judicial Council
of Virginia in 1993, briefly discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
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the introduced legislation was amended by the addition of a new
section 31-8.2 that empowers a commissioner of accounts "to
authorize the same distributions under the same circumstances as
the court may authorize ... except that (i) the total distributions
authorized in any one year shall not exceed $3,000 .. ."' Although
one can understand and be sympathetic to a desire for a shortcut
procedure in small cases, this particular shortcut appears to be
unconstitutional because its language goes on to expressly provide
that "[t]he provisions of § 31-8.1 B shall not apply to proceedings
under this section."' Section 31-8.1(B), thus made inapplicable in
cases before a commissioner, requires the appointment of a guardian
ad litem for a minor whose funds are being taken in a circuit court
proceeding.29 Thus, as newly added section 31-8.2 permits the taking
of a minor's property for a parent's benefit in a preceding before a
commissioner without anyone appearing on the minor's behalf, 30 it
would appear to be a taking without due process of law."'
E. Tenancy by the Entirety-Personal Property
The form of concurrent ownership known as the tenancy by the
entirety, which can exist only between a husband and wife, is the
most popular form of real estate ownership for married couples in
Virginia. The primary reason for this popularity is the immunity of
such property from the claims of the individual (but not the joint)
creditors of the husband and the wife. 32 There has been increasing
uncertainty, however, concerning whether, and if so to what extent,
personal property might be held in this fashion. 3' The 1999 Session
attempted to eliminate this uncertainty by adding section 55-20.1 to
the Virginia Code, providing in part that "[alny persons may own
real or personal property... if husband and wife, as tenants by the
entireties."34 However, as this statute does not contain an effective
Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1249, 1268 (1997).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-8.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
28. Id.
29. See id. § 31-8.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
30. See id. § 31-8.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
31. Section 31-8.2 does give one, ineffectual, nod in the direction of due process with its
provision that "the commissioner shall give five days written notice of the scheduled hearing
date to any minor who is fourteen years of age or older." Id.
32. This point was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in the recent case of
Rogers v. Rogers, 257 Va. 323, 512 S.E.2d 821 (1999). See infra Part III.J.
33. For an excellent discussion of the multiple facets of this uncertainty, see the opinion
in the recent case of In re Massey, 225 B.R. 887 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998). See discussion infra
Part uI.L.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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date provision, it may be found to be applicable only to estates
created after June 30, 1999. 31 In addition to adding new section
55-20.1, the 1999 Session amended section 55-9 to provide that
either spouse may be the conveyor creating their tenancy by the
entirety in realty or personalty, 36 and also amended section 55-21 to
provide that the intent to create such a tenancy "shall be manifest
from a designation of a husband and his wife as 'tenants by the
entireties' or'tenants by the entirety.'"3 7 A possible problem with the
amendment to section 55-21, giving illustrative language that would
show the requisite intent, is the fact that this section continues to
require such intent to be found in the "instrument" in question, and
the Supreme Court of Virginia has held that promissory notes are
not within the word "instrument" as used in section 55-21.
8
F. Augmented Estate-Separate Property
The purpose of the augmented estate's separate property exclusion
is to prevent a surviving spouse from obtaining any benefit based
upon the decedent's interest in property gratuitously received from
anyone other than the surviving spouse. 9 In order to make this
35. The argument for retroactive application of section 55-20.1 will be found in the
discussion of the amendments to section 55-9, infra note 36.
36. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-9 (Cum. Supp. 1999). This section already contained an
effective date provision stating that "[ajll such deeds made prior to July 1,1986, are validated
notwithstanding defects in the form thereof which do not affect vested rights." Id. § 55-9
(Repl. Vol. 1995). In addition to the action noted in the text, the 1999 amendments to section
55-9 also replaced the word "deeds" in this sentence with the word "conveyances" and, as
amended, this entire section is reenacted. See id. § 55-9 (Cum. Supp. 1999). The better view
would suggest that the amendment and reenactment of the effective date provision in section
55-9, which occurred in pari materia with the enactment of new section 55-20.1, shows a
legislative intent that section 55-20.1 should be treated the same way, i.e., retroactively,
except to the extent that such retroactivity would affect vested rights. See id. §§ 55-9, -20.1
(Cum. Supp. 1999).
37. Id. § 55-21 (Cum. Supp. 1999). This language is clearly intended to be interpreted as
illustrative and not mandatory. Thus a designation such as "ATBE," found in In re Massey,
225 B.R. 887 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998), commented on in Part III.L., infra, should be recognized
as sufficient under this section. For further discussion, see infra Part III.L.
38. See Pitts v. United States, 242 Va. 254, 260, 408 S.E.2d 901, 904 (1991).
39. The separate property provision specifically excludes
(ii) the value of any property, its income or proceeds, received by the
decedent by gift, will, or intestate succession, before or during the
marriage to the surviving spouse, from a person other than the surviving
spouse to the extent such property, income, or proceeds were maintained
by the decedent as separate property.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (first unnumbered paragraph following subsection (3Xd), prior to
the 1999 amendment) (Repl. Vol. 1995). Note: a further convenience added to this section by
the 1999 legislation is the numbering or lettering of every paragraph, which will eliminate
the necessity for awkward citations such as the one contained in the preceding sentence. See
id. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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exclusion applicable to every conceivable gratuitous transfer, the
original legislation referred to property received by (i) "will or
intestate succession" to include all probate transfers, and (ii) the
generic term "gift" to comprehensively include all other gratuitous
transfers. 40 A concern developed in recent years, however, that an
attorney or judge who is not learned in estate and property law
matters might give the word "gift" a more narrow construction than
was intended by the General Assembly. To prevent such an error
from occurring, the separate property exclusion is amended by
adding additional language declaratory of existing law as follows:
"gift, will, intestate succession, or any other method or form of trans-
fer to the extent it is received without full consideration in money or
money's worth."41
G. Augmented Estate-Valuation of Survivorship Property
Although nonseparate survivorship property has always been
subject to inclusion in a decedent's augmented estate under section
64.1-16.1, the Virginia Code has contained no rules for the valuation
of such property interests. A new paragraph added to this section in
1999 replaces this vacuum with a collection of valuation rules that,
except in two instances, are believed to be declaratory of original
intent and existing practice.42 One of the two new rules provides that
tenancy by the entirety property will be valued the same as a joint
tenancy with the right of survivorship and the other provides that
joint property owned by persons married to each other "shall be
rebuttably presumed to have been acquired with contributions of
equal value by each tenant."43
H. Joint Accounts in Financial Institutions-Disclosure
The longstanding issue of a decedent's intent regarding survivor-
ship in joint accounts in banks, savings and loan associations, and
credit unions led to the complete reform of the laws applicable to all
nonbusiness multiple-party accounts, in 1979, and their restatement
as one set of rules applicable to all such accounts in any financial
institution.' One of the innovations of this reform was section
40. See id. § 64.1-16.1(3)(d)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
41. Id. § 64.1-16.1(BXii) (Cum. Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
42. See id. § 64.1-16.1(C)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
43. Id.
44. See Act of Mar. 26,1979, ch. 407, 1979 Va. Acts 596 (codified as amended atVA. CODE
ANN. §§ 6.1-125.1 to -125.16 (Repl. Vol. 1999)). The background of this legislation may be
found in J. Rodney Johnson, Joint, Totten Trust, and P.O.D Bank Accounts; Virginia Law
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6.1-125.15, which provided that every financial institution offering
joint accounts "shall" offer its depositors two differently labeled
alternatives: "JOINT ACCOUNT WITH SURVIVORSHIP" and
"JOINTACCOUNT-NO SURVIVORSHIP."45 The 1999 amend-ment
to section 6.1-125.15 continues further down this same path by
providing that financial institutions "shall" also add certain
disclosure language to these labels, effective July 1, 2000.46
Though well-intentioned, the 1999 disclosure requirement suffers
from the same defect as the 1979 label requirement. Although both
of them state that financial institutions "shall" take the required
steps, there is no enforcement mechanism or penalty for failure to
comply, and twenty years after the label requirement became
effective, anecdotal evidence indicates that all financial institutions
have not yet complied.47 With all due respect, one wonders about the
efficacy of this disclosure language to accomplish the desired result.
It is submitted that the meanings of the terms "survivorship" and
"non-survivorship" are known to the average bank customer. If this
is true, it would appear that a problem exists today because (i) the
financial institution is not labeling the forms as required by existing
law, or (ii) the depositor is not reading the labels that are provided.
Personal experience suggests that the latter is the more likely
reason, but if either is true, the mandating of more language to be
ignored (whether by a financial institution or its customers) will not
solve the problem.
Compared to the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 41 (1973).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.15(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
46. See id. § 6.1-125.15(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999). The amendment provides in part:
Disclosure in a form substantially similar to the following shall
satisfy the requirements of this section:
Joint Account With Survivorship-On the death of a party to the
account, the deceased party's ownership in the account passes to
the surviving party or parties to the account.
Joint Account-No Survivorship-On the death of a party to the
account, the deceased partys ownership in the account passes as
a part of the party's estate under the party's will, trust [sic], or by
intestacy.
Id.
47. The recent case of Patterson v. Patterson, 257 Va. 558, 515 S.E.2d 113 (1999), noted
in Part IH.KI, infra, is of some relevance at this point. In this case Husband (using Wife's
funds) opened a $100,000 account with Wife, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship,
at a Richmond bank 19 days before Wife's death in 1995. See Patterson, 257 Va. at 560, 515
S.E.2d at 114. There was no evidence in the record that Wife was even aware that the bank
had allowed Husband to open this joint account, and it was clear that she did not sign a
signature card. See id.
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I. Succession-Paternity-Illegitimacy-Exhumation-Evidence
Section 32.1-286,' dealing with exhumations, was amended in
1997 to empower the circuit court to order disinterment for the
purpose of genetic testing to establish a biological relationship in
succession matters "[u]pon the presentation of substantial evidence
by a moving party that he will prevail in his attempt."49 The 1999
amendment to this section (i) strikes the above quoted "substantial
evidence" requirement, and (ii) states the opposite: "[t]his
provision... shall not require substantive proof of parentage to
obtain the exhumation order.""0 It is believed that most of such
exhumations will arise in the context of illegitimacy, and the bill
that made the above amendment also made minor amendments to
two statutes dealing with proof of paternity when illegitimacy is
involved.51
J. Boilerplate Powers-Custodial Trust-Incapacitated Person
The statutory boilerplate fiduciary powers in section 64.1-57 were
amended, in 1992, by the addition of a power to make distribution
for an incapacitated beneficiary to a custodial trustee under the
Uniform Custodial Trust Act.5" However, this 1992 amendment did
not clearly state what definition of "incapacitated" would control for
the purpose of this remedy: the standard "adjudicated" definition
found in guardianship and conservatorship law, 3 or the special
"functional" definition found in the Uniform Custodial Trust Act.54
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-286 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
49. Id. § 32.1-286(C) (Repl. Vol. 1997). The background and scope of this development is
discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates,
31 U. RICH. L. REv. 1249, 1262-63 (1997).
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-286(C) (Curn. Supp. 1999).
51. The section dealing with the meaning of child and related terms was amended by
adding a reference to "scientifically reliable genetic testing." Id. § 64.1-5.1(3)(b) (Cum. Supp.
1999). The section dealing with evidence of paternity was amended by (i) changing"medically
reliable genetic blood grouping tests" to "scientifically reliable genetic tests, including DNA
tests," and (ii) adding a reference to "scientific" to the previously referenced "medical and
anthropological evidence." Id. § 64.1-5.2(7), (8) (Cam. Supp. 1999). The interaction of these
two statutes was before the supreme court in Jones v. Eley, 256 Va. 198, 501 S.E.2d 405
(1998), noted infra Part HI.D.
52. Act of Mar. 31, 1992, ch. 584, 1992 Va. Acts 780 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-57(l)(p) (Repl. Vol. 1995)). The significance of this development is discussed in
J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 26 U. RICH.
L. REv. 873, 892 (1992).
53. See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.6 (Curn. Supp. 1999).
54. See id. § 55-34.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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The 1999 amendment to section 64.1-57 confirms the latter,
functional, definition to be the one intended.55
K. Judicial Grant of Boilerplate Powers-Inter Vivos Trust- Venue
Section 64.1-57.156 was added to the Virginia Code in 1976 to
permit a circuit court to grant the boilerplate fiduciary powers found
in section 64.1-57"7 to a decedent's personal representative." This
section was amended in 1985 to clarify that the term "personal
representative" included the administrator of an intestate estate;59
and again in 1988 to extend the scope of the section to trustees of
testamentary and inter vivos trusts." The 1988 extension created a
procedural problem, however, because the statute's original
language directed any fiduciary seeking the grant of these powers
"to the circuit court in which he is qualified,"--yet the trustee of an
inter vivos trust does not qualify in any court.6 ' The 1999 amend-
ment eliminates this problem by providing for venue in such cases
to be in "the circuit court for the jurisdiction in which the grantor
resides or resided at the time of his death, a trustee resides or a
corporate trustee has an office."6 2
L. Estate Tax-Marital Deduction-QTIP Election by Trustee
The Internal Revenue Code was amended, effective January 1,
1982, to create an estate tax marital deduction for the estate of a
married person who left a gift of "qualified terminable interest
property" to the surviving spouse.63 One of the requirements for
obtaining this deduction is that the decedent's "executor" make a
specific election on the estate tax return of the decedent's estate.'
In response to this new option, the 1982 Session added section
64.1-57.2 to the Code, to authorize a "personal representative" to
make the required election for qualified gifts passing to a surviving
spouse by will or inter vivos trust.65 The 1999 Session, responding to
55. See id. § 64.1-57(l)(p) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
56. Id. § 64.1-57.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
57. Id. § 64.1-57 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
58. See Act of Apr. 3, 1976, ch. 437, 1976 Va. Acts 509.
59. See Act of Mar. 17, 1985, ch. 345, 1976 Va. Acts 394.
60. See Act of Mar. 29, 1988, ch. 345, 1988 Va. Acts 416.
61. Id.
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57.1 (Cur. Supp. 1999).
63. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1986).
64. See id. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) (1986).
65. See Act of Apr. 11, 1982, ch. 551, 1982 Acts 945. This Act also made a parallel
amendment to the boilerplate powers statute at VA. CODE ANN. section 64.1-57(1)(s). Section
64.1-57.2 was amended the following year to provide for the finality of a good faith election.
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a concern arising where the decedent's estate plan is based upon an
inter vivos trust and where there may not be a"personal representa-
live" because there will be no probate estate, amended the statute
to provide in such cases that "[a]s used in this section, the term
'personal representative' shall include the trustee of a qualified
terminable interest property trust. 66
M. Durable Power of Attorney-Non-Judicial Accounting
The 1995 General Assembly responded to a concern for certain
victims of financial exploitation by enacting, among other remedies,
section 11-9.6 that provides for a nonjudicial accounting of the
activities of an agent under a durable power of attorney for a two-
year period." The 1999 Session amended this section to provide that,
if the principal dies before a request is made, (i) the request must be
made within one year of the death, and (ii) the two-year period of the
accounting begins at the time of death instead of the time of the
request."
N. Decedent's Estates-Funeral Expenses
Section 64.1-136.1, largely declaratory of existing law, was added
to the Code by the 1999 Session at the request of the Virginia
Bankers Association. 9 This section provides that a decedent's
reasonable funeral and burial expenses are an obligation of the
decedent's estate, and that the estate is liable therefore to "(i) the
funeral establishment, (ii) the cemetery, (iii) any third-party creditor
who finances the payment of such expenses, or (iv) any person
authorized to make arrangements for the funeral of the decedent
who has paid such expenses." 70 However, a possible problem may be
created by this new statute when a person borrows from a bank to
pay a decedent's funeral expenses, uses the borrowed funds for that
purpose, obtains reimbursement from the decedent's personal
representative for the funeral expenses so paid and then, after
expending these funds for private purposes, is unable to repay the
See Act of Mar. 10, 1983, ch. 54, 1983 Va. Acts 61.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
67. See Act of Mar. 18, 1995, ch. 369, 1995 Va. Acts 522. The background and operation
of this remedy is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills,
Trusts, and Estates, 29 U. RiH. L. REV. 1175, 1176-77 (1995).
68. See VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.6 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
69. See id. § 64.1-136.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
70. Id. This provision is expressly made subject to VA. CODE ANN. section 64.1-157 (Cum.
Supp. 1999), which, in insolvent estates, makes funeral expenses a priority-three claim,
subject to a $2,000 limitation. See id.
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creditor bank. In this case the literal language of part (iii) of the new
statute creates a direct liability of the decedent's estate to "any
third-party creditor who finances the payment of such expenses, " -
and it may also have introduced some uncertainty into the law and
practice of fiduciary administration.
0. Fiduciary Accounting-Federal Benefits Excluded
With one exception, every court-appointed fiduciary of another's
property who qualifies in the clerk's office is required to file an
annual accounting with the commissioner of accounts detailing all
receipts and disbursements during the accountingperiod." However
no provision of Virginia law requires a representative payee" who
receives only federal source benefits74 on behalf of another to account
for the same before the commissioner." It has been unclear,
however, whether a fiduciary who was required to make an account-
ing because of other income or property, and who was also serving
as a representative payee for the same beneficiary, had to also
include any federal source benefits in the required accounting. A
1999 amendment to section 26-17.10 ends this uncertainty by
providing that "no accounting to the commissioner shall be required
of [federal source] benefits paid to a designated representative on
behalf of the recipient if the representative is otherwise required to
account for such benefits."76 Although no detailed accounting will
now be required in connection with federal source benefits, the 1999
amendment goes on to provide that a fiduciary who is required to
71. Id. § 64.1-136.1(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
72. See id. § 26-17.3 (Repl. Vol. 1997). One exception is made for testamentary trusts
created in wills probated after July 1, 1993, in which the testator has expressly waived the
trustee's duty to account. See id. § 26-17.7 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
73. "Representative payee" is a federal law term identifying a person who receives federal
source benefits on behalf of another who is unable to manage the benefits because of a mental
condition, a physical condition, or youth. See, for example, in connection with Social Security
benefits, 20 C.F.R. § 404.2001 (1998).
74. The primary federal source benefits are Social Security, supplemental security
income, and Veteran's benefits.
75. The representative payee of such benefits may be subject to an obligation to account
therefore to some agency of the federal government. For example, the SOCIAL SECuRrrY
ADMIN., PUB. No. 65-008, SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK (13th ed. 1997), provides in part that
"[a]n annual report form (Representative Payee Report) is sent to representative payees for
them to explain how Social Security benefits or SSI payments were managed during the
12-month report period .... Depending on the payee's responses, SSA may have to interview
the payee and complete a more detailed report (Representative Payee Evaluation Report) in
order to determine the continued suitability of the representative payee." Id. at § 1622.
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-17.10(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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account under Virginia law "shall disclose thereon the total amount
of such (federal source) benefits received during the accounting
period."" The purpose of this single entry disclosure is to enable the
commissioner to determine the total resources available to a
beneficiary from all sources, so that the commissioner might know
how much, if any, of the beneficiary's other assets might need to be
expended to provide for a beneficiary who is also receiving federal
source benefits during the accounting period.
P. Fiduciary Accounting-Corporate Affidavits-Check Copies
Section 26-17.9, dealing with the vouchers or receipts required to
support expenditures in a fiduciary accounting before the commis-
sioner of accounts, was the subject of two 1999 amendments
requested by the Virginia Bankers Association.78 The first amend-
ment, expressly restricted to corporate fiduciaries, allows them to
submit one affidavit attesting to all of their disbursements for debts,
taxes, and expenses, instead of having to submit a separate receipt
or voucher for each disbursement. 9 The second amendment,
ostensibly available to all fiduciaries, allows them to use a front-and-
back copy of a check as a voucher or receipt, instead of having to
submit the original check to the commissioner, if the "copy was made
in the regular course of business in accordance with the admissibil-
ity requirements of § 8.01-391." " However this apparent relaxation
of the "no copy of a check" rule will be unavailable to the typical
fiduciary because of the "regular course of business" limitations
imposed by the reference to section 8.01-391.8'
Q. Fiduciary Administration-Technical & Procedural
Amendments
In response to a request of the Standing Committee on Commis-
sioners of Accounts of the Judicial Council of Virginia, the 1999
Session made the following technical or procedural amendments: (1)
the words "guardians of minor's estates" were added to the statute
imposing the accounting requirement on fiduciaries for incapacitated
persons; 2 (2) erroneous references to "§ 26-17" were changed to
77. Id.
78. See id. § 26-17.9 (Cur. Supp. 1999).
79. See id.
80. Id. § 26-17.9(E) (Cure. Supp. 1999).
81. See id.
82. Id. § 26-17.4(A) (Cu. Supp. 1999). This provision was inadvertently omitted in the
1997 reform of the laws applicable to guardians of adults.
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"§ 26-17.3" in the statute dealing with forfeiture of fiduciary
commissions, 3 and in the statute permitting three-year accountings
in small estates;84 and (3) the statute dealing with the commissioner
of accounts' enforcement procedure when a fiduciary fails to account
was revised. 5
R. Federal Estate Tax-Conservation Easement Exclusion
Section 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code, 6 which defines the
concept of the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes, provides
for a limited exclusion from taxation for land subject to a qualified
conservation easement if, among other things, the estate's executor
makes the appropriate election. The necessity of this election
presents no problem where all of the estate's beneficiaries are
competent, consenting adults. The problem presented by the
inability of other beneficiaries to consent to such an election by the
executor (or by the trustee where the property is in a trust) is
addressed by the 1999 Session's creation of new section 64.1-57.3
that authorizes the circuit court to give this consent "on behalf of
any unborn, unascertained or incapacitated heirs, beneficiaries and
devisees whose interests are affected thereby."8
S. Charitable Trusts-Shares of Professional Entities
This 1999 legislation authorizes the transfer of shares in profes-
sional corporations and membership interests in limited liability
companies to a "qualified charitable remainder trust," if certain
conditions are met.8 9
T. Fiduciary Administration-Multistate Trust Institutions Act
This lengthy legislation, the Multistate Trust Institutions Act,9°
was enacted by the 1999 Session "to enable and promote the
83. See id. § 26-19 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
84. See id. § 26-20 (Curn. Supp. 1999).
85. See id. § 26-18 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
86. I.R.C. § 2031 (1968).
87. See id. § 2031(c).
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57.3 (Cum. Supp. 1999). This statute provides that a guardian
ad litem must be appointed to represent such persons, and the court must find that "(i) the
donation of the conservation easement will not adversely affect such heirs, beneficiaries or
devisees or (ii) it is more likely than not that such heirs, beneficiaries or devisees would
consent if they were before the court and capable of giving consent." Id.
89. Act of Mar. 15, 1999, ch. 100, 1999 Va. Acts 126 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 13.1-550, -552, -1115, -1117 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
90. Act of Mar. 29, 1999, ch. 835, 1999 Va. Acts 1516 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 6.1-32.31 to -32.45 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
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establishment of trust offices in other states by Virginia banks, trust
companies and trust subsidiaries, and to permit out-of-state trust
institutions, including without limitation national banks whose




A. Charitable Entity-Standing of Attorney General
Tauber v. Commonwealth92 involved the disposition of assets
located in Virginia that belonged to a Maryland charitable corpora-
tion in dissolution." To the claimed error of the trial court in
allowing the Virginia Attorney General to bring this case, the
supreme court responded that it had "long ago recognized the
common law authority of the Attorney General to act on behalf of the
public in matters involving charitable assets."94
B. Contracts to Make a Will
In Runion v. Helvesting,95 the trial court sustained a demurrer to
plaintiffs' claim of an oral contract for a devise of certain real estate,
and for a purchase option on other real estate, that were both based
upon plaintiffs' promise to provide long-term care for the property
owner.96 Applying the "well-established" requirements for the
enforcement of such oral contracts to the facts that were admitted
for purposes of the demurrer,97 the case was reversed and remanded
for a trial on the merits. 98
C. Future Interests-Vested or Contingent Remainder
In Coleman v. Coleman,99 testatrix devised certain real estate to
S for life, and also left a remainder in one-half of the same real
estate to S (by way of the residuary clause in testatrix's will).' S
survived testatrix and there was no condition of survivorship
91. VA. CODEANN. § 6.1-32.31(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).-
92. 255 Va. 445,499 S.E.2d 839(1998).
93. See id. at 448, 499 S.E.2d at 840.
94. Id. at 451,499 S.E.2d at 842 (citing Clark v. Oliver, 91 Va. 421,427-28,22 S.E. 175,
177 (1895)).
95. 256 Va. 1, 501 S.E.2d 411 (1998).
96. See id at 3, 501 S.E.2d at 412.
97. Id. at 6,501 S.E.2d at 414 (quoting Wright v. Puckett, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 370 (1872)).
98. See id. at 10, 501 S.E.2d at 415-16.
99. 256 Va. 64, 500 S.E.2d 507 (1998).
100. See id. at 65, 500 S.E.2d at 508.
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expressed in testatrix's will.' Nevertheless, the trial court held that
S's remainder in this real estate was a contingent remainder that
failed upon her death because S "did not possess a 'present capacity'
to take her residuary interest upon termination of the prior life
estate." °2 The Supreme Court of Virginia referring to the early
vesting rule as "a firmly established principle of will construction in
Virginia,"' reversed and entered final judgment that S's remainder
interest vested absolutely in S at testatrix's death.' 4
D. Intestate Succession-Illegitimacy-Clear and Convincing
Evidence
Section 64.1-5.1 of the Code,'0 5 which replaced its unconstitutional
predecessor in 1978,106 marks the beginning of illegitimate succes-
sion through males in Virginia law.'0 7 As introduced, that legislation
contained a simple "clear and convincing evidence" test for establish-
ing paternity. However, a fear of spurious paternity claims in those
pre-DNA days led the General Assembly to restrict this test to "clear
and convincing evidence as set forth in § 64.1-5.2."1°8 Section
64.1-5.2,1°9 created expressly for this purpose, contained a listing of
six exclusive evidences of paternity that were taken from then
existing section 20-61.1 (used for determining paternity for child
support purposes), which was declared unconstitutional in 1984.110
Ultimately recognizing that this same unconstitutional taint also
infected section 64.1-5.2, the 1991 Session rather dramatically
amended it by reversing the introductory language preceding the
listed evidences from "shall be limited to" to "may include, but shall
not be limited to.""'
101. See id.
102. Id. This unique future interests analysis was not further discussed as there was
neither brief nor argument for appellees in the supreme court. See id.
103. Id. at 66, 500 S.E.2d at 508.
104. See id at 67, 500 S.E.2d at 509.
105. VA. CoDEANN. § 64.1-5.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
106. See id. § 64.1-5 (repealed in 1978).
107. See id. § 64.1-5.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999). The background ofthis development is discussed
in J. Rodney Johnson, Inheritance Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 275
(1978).
108. VA. CODEANN. § 64.1-5.1(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1995). This is still the language of VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-5.1(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
109. Id. § 64.1-5.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
110. See Jones v. Robinson, 229 Va. 276, 287, 329 S.E.2d 794, 802 (1985). This
development is discussed inJ. Rodney Johnson,Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts,
and Estates, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 779, 792-94 (1985).
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995). This development is discussed in J.
Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 25 U. RICH. L.
REV. 925, 925-27 (1991).
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In this context, the supreme court in a four to three decision in
Jones v. Eley,"2 concluded that the trial court's factual determina-
tion that petitioners were the decedent's illegitimate children was
supported by clear and convincing evidence.' In addition to
disagreeing with the majority based upon the evidence presented,
the dissenting opinion refers several times to the fact that none of
the factors mentioned in section 64.1-5.2 were proven."4 In light of
this section's tortured history (which the dissent does not indicate
was called to its attention), however, this concern would not appear
to be justified."5
E. Deed of Gift-Rescission
InAyers v. Mosby,"6 testatrix's executors, who were also devisees
of a half-interest in certain real estate under her will, sought to
rescind testatrix's deed of gift to this same realty, executed eighteen
months prior to the will in question, based on allegations of mutual
mistake of fact or coercion." No new issues of law were presented:
"[t]he facts are virtually undisputed; the controversy is over the
inferences to be drawn from the facts.""' After reviewing the facts,
the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the chancellor's award of
summary judgment to the defendant." 9
112. 256 Va. 198, 501 S.E.2d 405 (1998).
113. See id. at 201, 501 S.E.2d at 408.
114. See id. at 204-05, 501 S.E.2d at 708-09 (Koontz, J., dissenting).
115. See id. (Koontz, J., dissenting).
116. 256 Va. 228, 504 S.E.2d 845 (1998).
117. See id. at 229, 504 S.E.2d at 846.
118. Id- at 230, 504 S.E.2d at 846.
119. See id. at 235, 504 S.E.2d at 849. In the course of its opinion the supreme court
noted that
To carry out her plan to dispose of her assets in order to qualify for
Medicaid funding, the decedent intentionally transferred the fee simple
interest in her real property to defendant so that he could "take care"
of her. There was no mistake on her part; she accomplished just what
she intended, that is, to liquidate her assets but have them remain
available for support during her life.
Id. at 234, 504 S.E.2d at 848. There is no mention of any possible fraudulent intent
motivating the decedent in this transaction or the impact, if any, that such an intent might
have on the transfer in question.
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F. Trustee's Implied Power to Grant Purchase Option
The primary issue in Ward v. Nationsbank of Virginia, N.A. 12 was
whether a trustee breached its fiduciary duty by granting a purchase
option over the trust's real estate when the trust document, which
did not expressly confer a power upon the Trustee to grant such an
option, did contain an express power to sell real estate.'2 ' The trial
court relied upon the Restatement of Trusts for the common-law rule
that "'[w]here by the terms of a trust a power of sale is conferred
upon the trustee, it is ordinarily not proper for the trustee to give an
option to purchase property. " 122 The supreme court held that the
trial court erred on this point because the claimed option power was
not based solely upon the power to sell, but was instead to be found
implied from the settlors' intent, the language of the trust agree-
ment, and the purpose of the trust." In this latter regard the
supreme court referred to traditional boilerplate language in the
trust instrument stating that the trustee might
do all other acts and things not inconsistent with [the trust agreement
which the trustee] may deem necessary or desirable for the proper
management [of the trust] in the same manner and to the same extent
as an individual might or could do with respect to his own property.'m
Immediately following this quotation, the supreme court's opinion
states that "[a]ny reasonable interpretation of this language would
include the ability of the Trustee to grant an option to purchase."2 5
This rather absolute statement, instead of the ejusdem generis
interpretation that one might have anticipated, gives significantly
more impact to a standard form-book provision than one might have
expected, and if this is what the court intends, attorneys will need
to exercise correspondingly greater care when drafting trust
agreements in the future. There is some question concerning the
court's meaning, however, because immediately after saying "[a]ny
reasonable interpretation ... would include," the decision states
"[t]herefore, we must determine whether an option to purchase is
120. 256 Va. 427, 507 S.E.2d 616 (1998).
121. See id. at 431-32, 507 S.E.2d at 618. Other issues that were decided within the
framework of existing law were (i) good faith exercise of a fiduciary power, (ii) removal of a
trustee, and (iii) award of attorney's fees to a trustee. See id. at 434-41, 507 S.E.2d at 621-25.
122. Id. at 434, 507 S.E.2d at 620 (quoting from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 190
cmt. k (1959)).
123. See id. at 434-35, 507 S.E.2d at 620-21.
124. Id. at 435, 507 S.E.2d at 621.
125. Id.
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appropriate or necessary to carry out the purpose of the trust."126
This factual determination was resolved in the affirmative.
12
G. Joint Investment Account-Presumption of Survivorship-
Survivorship
In Buck v. Jordan,2 ' Father and Daughter opened a joint
investment account with Investment Corporation that was funded
with $100,000 supplied by Father and titled as "Joint Tenants with
Rights of Survivorship and not as tenants in common or as tenants
by the entirety" based upon a form signed by Father and
Daughter. 29 In an action brought to determine ownership of this
account following Father's death, the trial court held for daughter
because the language of this form was "'clear, unambiguous, and
unequivocal and sufficient to rebut the presumption, to which the
trial court referred, that the account was opened solely as conve-
nience to [Father]." 3 The presumption that this investment account
was opened for the convenience of Father (because he supplied the
funds), to which the trial court referred, is also recognized by the
supreme court at two places in its opinion.'' However, the only
authority cited by the supreme court for this presumption involves
deposit accounts in financial institutions (banks, savings and loan
associations, and credit unions) wherein, the supreme court
126. Id. at 435-36, 507 S.E.2d at 621.
127. See id. at 442, 507 S.E.2d at 625.
128. 256 Va. 535, 508 S.E.2d 880 (1998).
129. Id. at 537-38, 508 S.E.2d at 881. The form that Father and Daughter signed "further
provided that '[in the event of the death of either or any of the undersigned, the entire
interest in the Joint Account shall be vested in the survivor.... ." Id. at 538 n.1, 508 S.E.2d
at 881 n.1. This additional language approximates the disclosure language mandated by the
1999 Session of the General Assembly for joint accounts in financial institutions (effective
July 1,1999) that is intended to make the parties to such accounts aware of the consequences
of the term "joint tenants with the right of survivorship." See supra Part II.H. Interestingly,
when Father had another person telephone Investment Corporation to inquire about the form
and consequences of the investment account in this case, (i) the first responder stated that
the account was owned as "joint tenants in common ... [meaning that] 'if one passes away
the Estate of that individual will receive that half and the other living party will get half,
Buck, 256 Va. at 539, 508 S.E.2d at 881-82; (ii) in a later call a second responder stated 'if one
passes away ... the survivor gets 100 percent of the account," id.; and (iii) in a final call to
the first responder that person replied that the second responder "has no knowledge on this
account whatsoever," id.; and repeated the original response that it was owned by Father and
Daughter as tenants in common. See id.
130. Id. at 540, 508 S.E.2d at 882.
131. See id. at 537-38, 542-43, 508 S.E.2d at 881, 883-84.
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recognizes, it was abolished in 1980,132 and the present case involves
an investment account with an investment company.
133
If this "presumption of convenience," formerly applicable to deposit
accounts in financial institutions, 1 4 is to now be the rule for
investment accounts with investment corporations, logically it must
also be applied to investment accounts with brokerage houses,
mutual funds, etc. Accordingly, this case is of great significance for
the investment community and it may also signal a need for some
form of legislation because of the potential confusion that will now
exist in the investment marketplace. Take, for instance, the case
where a consumer goes into a bank and opens a $50,000 deposit
account at desk number one (with an employee of the bank) and then
opens a $50,000 investment account at desk number two (with an
employee of the bank's separately chartered investment company).135
One can argue that a presumption of convenience should be
applicable to both accounts, or to neither account, but it is submit-
ted, one cannot argue for such a presumption to be applicable at
desk number two but not at desk number one. Going a bit further
down this same road, it might be noted that the larger issue is
further confused by the fact that, although a presumption of
convenience now exists for joint "investment accounts," such a
presumption apparently does not exist for individual joint "invest-
ments" themselves. 36
Coming back to the case at hand, the supreme court noted that
although the common-law rule of survivorship between joint tenants
has been abolished in Virginia, there is an exception in cases where
"it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was
intended the part of the one dying should belong to the others."'37 In
this matter of first impression, the court held that this statutory
132. See id. at 542 n.5, 508 S.E.2d at 884 n.5.
133. See id.
134. For a discussion of the presumption of convenience as formerly applicable to joint
accounts in financial institutions, see Johnson, supra note 44.
135. The investment account in the present case was opened with Sovran Investment
Corporation. See Buck, 256 Va. at 538, 508 S.E.2d at 881.
136. In Wrenn v. Daniels, 200 Va. 419, 106 S.E.2d 126 (1958), "[clounsel for complainant
... contend that no such presumption [of convenience] exists with regard to the transfer of
shares of stock to a form of joint ownership.... Counsel for defendant agree with that
statement of law," and the supreme court appears to also agree. Id. at 426-27, 106 S.E.2d at
131. This result would appear to strengthen the suggestion made in the text for legislation
to develop a consistent body of rules for jointly held assets, regardless of the form or nature
of the property or entity involved.
137. Id. at 542, 508 S.E.2d at 883 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 1995)).
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exception was applicable to the investment account in the present
case, and after examining the "tenor of the instrument" signed by
Father and Daughter, affirmed the trial court decision in favor of
Daughter. 3 8
R- Promissory Notes-Joint Tenancy-Ownership-Survivorship
In Zink v. Stafford, 39 Father sold parcels of real estate to four
persons, taking back promissory notes in three cases that were made
to "Father and Daughter or the survivor," and in the other case
made to him individually but later endorsed over to "Father or
Daughter or the survivor."40 Daughter claimed these promissory
notes after Father's death on the basis that, pursuant to section
55-21, "the tenor of the instrument" showed a clear intent for
survivorship.' However, one of Father's intestate successors argued
that Daughter's survivorship issue would not arise unless she could
first establish an ownership interest in these notes. 42 The supreme
court agreed and, although noting that the form of titling is
ordinarily prima facie evidence of ownership, concluded on the facts
of the case that Father never intended to make any lifetime gift to
Daughter.'43 Instead, "the survivorship language on each note was
an abortive testamentary act and not a gift."'
I. Will Contest-Person Interested-Object of Power of Appointment
In Martone v. Martone,45 the trial court upheld testator's 1995 will
in a proceeding in which testator's beneficiary and all of his heirs
138. See id. at 542, 508 S.E.2d at 883.
139. 257 Va. 46, 509 S.E.2d 833 (1999).
140. Id. at 49, 509 S.E.2d at 834.
141. Id. at 48, 509 S.E.2d 833-34. In this regard Daughter sought to distinguish the present
case from Pitts v. United States, 242 Va. 254, 408 S.E.2d 901 (1991), wherein the supreme
court held that promissory notes were not within the word "instrument" as used in section
55-21. See id. at 260, 408 S.E.2d at 904.
142. See Zink, 257 Va. at 50, 509 S.E.2d at 835.
143. See id. at 51, 509 S.E.2d at 835.
144. Id. at 51, 509 S.E.2d at 836. Without disagreeing with this quote as an accurate
statement of existing law, one might nevertheless ask why this has to be so. Had the
language in question been on four bank accounts (debts owed by a bank) instead of on four
promissory notes (debts owed by individuals) the result would have been different. IfFather's
intent for Daughter to have these funds following his death is clear, should a matter of form
control the substance and frustrate this intent? The provisions of article 6, section 101 of the
Uniform Probate Code, entitled "Nonprobate Transfers on Death," offers a statutory vehicle
for addressing cases such as this. "The sole purpose of this section is to prevent the transfers
authorized here from being treated as testamentary." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101, cmt.
(amended 1989), 8 U.L.A. 431 (1969).
145. 257 Va. 199, 509 S.E.2d 302 (1999).
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were joined as parties.'46 Thereafter a grandchild, whose parent was
a party in the prior proceeding, brought an action attacking the 1995
will and seeking to establish testator's 1991 will.' The grandchild
claimed to not be bound by the prior proceeding for lack of being a
party, and further claimed standing to contest the 1995 will as a
"person interested" under the 1991 will, a term not previously
defined in Virginia law.4 ' In responding to this issue of first
impression, the supreme court held that to be a "person interested,"
"an individual must have a legally ascertainable pecuniary interest,
which will be impaired by probating a will or benefitted by setting
aside the will, and not a mere expectancy."'49 The grandchild's
claimed pecuniary interest under the 1991 will was based on a
power granted to testator's executor over net income during the
period of administration to (i) distribute within a class of objects
composed of testator's spouse and issue, (ii) accumulate and add to
the residuary estate, or (iii) apply to estate obligations.' The
supreme court concluded that the grandchild's interest as a member
of the class defined as testator's "issue" under (i) "is a mere expec-
tancy, not a legally ascertainable right. It is, therefore, not sufficient
to satisfy the requirement of a 'person interested' under Virginia
Code § 64.1-90." 151
J. Tenancy by the Entirety-Separate Judgments by Same Creditor
The question in Rogers v. Rogers,"' was "whether creditors, who
obtained a judgment against a husband and a different judgment
against his wife, may compel the sale of real property owned by the
husband and wife as tenants by the entireties with right of survivor-
ship to satisfy those judgments."'53 Notwithstanding plaintiffs claim
that a different result should be allowed where the separate
judgments are related, the supreme court affirmed the common law
rule that tenancy by the entirety property is "exempt from the
claims of creditors who do not have joint judgments against the
husband and wife."'54
146. See id. at 202, 509 S.E.2d at 304.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 205-06, 509 S.E.2d at 306.
150. See id. at 204-05, 509 S.E.2d at 304-06.
151. Id. at 207, 509 S.E.2d at 306.
152. 257 Va. 323, 512 S.E.2d 821 (1999).
153. Id. at 324, 512 S.E.2d at 821.
154. Id. at 326, 512 S.E.2d at 822.
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K Certificate of Deposit-Husband and Wife-Ownership-
Survivorship
The facts established in Patterson v. Patterson55 show that,
nineteen days prior to her death, wife withdrew $100,000 of her own
funds from Bank A and turned it over to Husband who deposited it
in Bank B in their joint names with the right of survivorship, but
that Wife did not sign Bank B's signature card or in any other way
ratify the creation of this account.'56 After reviewing the evidence,
the supreme court held that the trial court's decision that Wife "did
not intend to make a gift to her husband ... is not plainly wrong or
without adequate evidence to support it and, thus, will not be
disturbed on appeal."'
L. Bankruptcy-Tenancy by the Entirety in Personal Property
In In re Massey,' "the sole issue before the court [was] whether,
under Virginia law, shares of stock and a brokerage account-neither
of which constitutes proceeds of, or the rents or profits from, tenancy
by the entireties real estate-can be held as tenants by the entirety
and thereby claimed exempt under § 522(b)(2)(B), Bankruptcy
Code."'59 The court's opinion, which answers this question in the
affirmative, contains a comprehensive treatment of Virginia's
troubled history relating to tenancies by the entireties in personal
property.160
IV. CONCLUSION
Most of the estate-related legislative and judicial developments
during the period of this review were positive. However, three of
these matters deserve attention in the 2000 Session. The joint
account disclosure provisions' 6' do not offer a realistic solution to the
present problems in this area of the law and thus they should be
either strengthened or repealed before they become effective on
July 1, 2000. The supreme court's resurrection of the "presumption
of convenience" from prior bank account law and application thereof
155. 257 Va. 558, 515 S.E.2d 113 (1999).
156. See id. at 560, 515 S.E.2d at 114.
157. Id. at 564, 515 S.E.2d at 116.
158. 225 B.R. 887 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998).
159. Id. at 888.
160. See id. at 889-90. It is this troubled history that led to the 1999 legislation discussed
in supra Part II.E that attempts to resolve all facets of this issue.
161. See discussion supra Part II.H.
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to investment accounts'62 has created an unacceptable confusion for
the consumer that can only be resolved by legislation. Increased
recognition of nonprobate transfers at death... is a worthy goal
deserving of legislative action.
162. See discussion supra Part III.G.
163. See discussion supra Part III.H.
